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Abstract
We investigate the secrecy capacity of an ergodic fading wiretap channel in which the main channel
is correlated with the eavesdropper channel. In this study, the full Channel State Information (CSI) is
assumed, and thus the transmitter knows the channel gains of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
By analyzing the resulting secrecy capacity we quantify the loss of the secrecy capacity due to the
correlation. In addition, we study the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy capacity as Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) tends to infinity. The capacity of an ordinary fading channel logarithmically increases with
SNR. On the contrary, the secrecy capacity converges into a limit which can be an upper bound on
the secrecy capacity over the fading wiretap channel. We find a closed form of the upper bound for the
correlated Rayleigh wiretap channel which also includes the independent case as a special one. Our work
shows that the upper bound is determined by only two channel parameters; the correlation coefficient and
the ratio of the main to the eavesdropper channel gains that will be called PCC and CGR respectively.
The analysis of the upper bound tells how the two channel parameters affect the secrecy capacity and
leads to the conclusion that the excessively large signal power does not provide any advantage in the
secrecy capacity, and the loss due to the correlation is especially serious in low CGR regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy [1] was first introduced by Shannon where he showed
that the transmitter and the legitimate receiver need to share a random key of length k to secure
k bit information from the eavesdropper. That is, the transmitted message W is independent of the
eavesdropper’s observation Z; I(W ;Z) = 0 which is called perfect secrecy. Although the perfect secrecy
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2provides unconditional secrecy, such a system called a one-time pad requires a new random key for each
new message. Thus, it may not be considered as a feasible solution in some practical situations.
Due to the difficulty of the secret key distribution, the secrecy issues have been usually addressed with
cryptographic protocols such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) scheme and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) which instead provide computational security. That is, to break the secrecy measures in
time, the required complexity of the eavesdropper becomes prohibited with current technology. Although
the concept of computational security is relatively weak as compared to the perfect secrecy, it has been
widely adopted in practical systems and implemented on the application layer independent of the physical
layer design.
In the meantime, Wyner also considered the information-theoretic secrecy on a channel model called
wiretap channel [2] where a legitimate receiver communicates over a main channel, and observations at
a wiretapper 1 are degraded from the ones at the legitimate receiver. He showed that the information
rate to the legitimate receiver and the ignorance at the wiretapper can be traded off when the wiretapper
has a degraded channel. In his work, the maximum information rate of the main channel with the total
ignorance at the wiretapper is defined as secrecy capacity, and he proved the existence of channel codes
achieving the secrecy capacity. Hence the perfect secrecy is now achievable without sharing random keys.
After his work, there have been numerous related works [3], [4], [5], [6] for variations of the wiretap
channel.
Recently, the proliferation of wireless devices has contributed to the improvement of living standards,
but on the other hands caused a growing uneasiness about the leakage of private information. This
insecurity may be attributed to the broadcast nature of radio propagation and the inherent randomness of
wireless channel which make the radio transmission vulnerable to attacks from unexpected eavesdroppers.
Thus, it seems to be a matter of course to apply the results of the wiretap channels to the secrecy
of wireless communications. However, due to the nature of wireless communications, it is not always
guaranteed that the eavesdropper channel is noisier than the main channel. In many cases, the eavesdropper
can have even a better channel which results in zero secrecy capacity.
Soon, it is realized that the inherent randomness of wireless channels gives an opportunity to achieve a
positive secrecy capacity even if the eavesdropper channel is better in the average sense. On slow fading
channels, the secrecy capacity is investigated in terms of outage probability [7], [8]. Further studies on
the secrecy capacity of wireless channels have been done in many difference aspects; the ergodic secrecy
1We will use the wiretapper and the eavesdropper interchangeably.
3capacity of fading in [9], [10], [11], secure broadcasting in [12], [13] space-time signal processing [14],
[15], [16] and etc.
In this correspondence we investigate the secrecy capacity of an ergodic fading wiretap channel in
which the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel. The ergodic fading wiretap channel
was already studied in [11] where messages are transmitted opportunistically when the main channel
has a better instantaneous channel gain than that of the eavesdropper channel. Thus even in the case
that the main channel is noisier, due to the opportunistic transmission, a positive secrecy capacity is still
achievable. However, if the two channels are correlated, such an opportunistic scheme loses the chance to
transmit and thus leads to a loss of the secrecy capacity. In real radio environments, correlation between
two channels is frequently observed [17], [18]. The level of the correlation highly depends on antenna
deployments, proximity of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, and scatterers around them [17],
[18], [19], [20]. For example, antenna deployments at high altitude in rural or suburban area generate
dominant line-of-sight paths, which results in high correlation between the two receivers. Moreover, it is
also possible that the eavesdropper actively induces the correlation, e.g., by approaching the legitimate
receiver. Although the correlation is a crucial channel parameter affecting the secrecy capacity, to the
best of our knowledge, no previous study has been done on this topic.
Motivated by the practical scenario, we first derive the secrecy capacity for the correlated wiretap
channel and analyze the impact of the correlation on the secrecy capacity, which quantitatively show
how much of the secrecy capacity will be lost due to the correlation. However, we are more interested
in the analytic study on the secrecy capacity with different values of channel parameters. To do so,
we investigate the asymptotic behaviors of the secrecy capacity as Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) tends
to infinity. The capacity of an ordinary fading channel logarithmically increases with SNR [20]. On the
contrary, the secrecy capacity converges into a limit which can be an upper bound on the secrecy capacity
over the fading wiretap channel. We find a closed form of the upper bound for the correlated Rayleigh
wiretap channel which also includes the independent case [11] as a special one. Our work shows that the
upper bound is determined by only two channel parameters; the correlation coefficient and the ratio of
the main to the eavesdropper channel gains. The analysis of the upper bound tells how the two channel
parameters affect the secrecy capacity and leads to the conclusion that the excessively large signal power
does not provide any advantage in the secrecy capacity. In addition, we will show that the loss due to the
correlation is especially detrimental where the channel gain ratio is small. We believe our work makes
the results in [11] more comprehensive and also provides a way to evaluate the required rate margin due
to the active eavesdropper who intensionally induces the correlation. Although we focus on the secrecy
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Fig. 1. System model
capacity of the correlated ergodic fading wiretap channel, the analysis can be easily applicable to other
scenarios such as the outage probability analysis on the slow fading channel [7], [8].
The remainder of this correspondence is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system
model considered in our work. The secrecy capacity for the correlated ergodic fading channel is presented
in Section III. The upper bound of the formulated secrecy capacity is also derived in a closed-form
expression in Section III. In Section IV we present the numerical results and discuss the relation between
the correlation and the loss of the secrecy capacity. Finally, we summarize our results in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let us consider a fading wiretap channel model depicted in Fig. 1. A transmitter constructs an (M,n)
code and wishes to send the message to a legitimate receiver with an arbitrarily low probability of
error, while securing against eavesdropping of an unintended user. Specifically, the transmitter maps
confidential messages W ∈ W = {1, . . . ,M} to a codeword xn ∈ X n by using a stochastic encoder
fn (·) : W → X n. Then, the received signals of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper at the i-th
coherent time are given as follows:
y (i) = gM (i) x (i) + nM (i)
z (i) = gE (i) x (i) + nE (i) ,
where nM (i) and nE (i) are the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise with zero
mean and unit variance, and gM (i) and gE (i) denote the channel gains of the main and eavesdropper
channels respectively. We assume that the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel,
and the both are ergodic block fading channels. The legitimate receiver then decodes received signals
5yn ∈ Yn by using a function φ (·) : Yn →W . Let wˆ = φ (yn) be the estimated messages at the legitimate
receiver, then the average error probability of an (M,n) code is defined as
Pne =
1
M
∑
w∈W
Pr (wˆ 6= w|w is sent) .
Let us denote the power gains of the main and eavesdropper channels as hM (i) = |gM (i)|2 and
hE (i) = |gE (i)|2 respectively and assume the full channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter. Then
the equivocation rate which measures the secrecy level of confidential messages against the eavesdropper
is defined as
Re ,
1
n
H (W |Zn, hnM , hnE) ,
where hnM and hnE are the vectors of the power gains for the main and the eavesdropper channels.
Adopting the definition from [11], [21], [22], we say that the rate Rs is achievable with weak secrecy
if, for any given ǫ > 0, there exists a
(
2nRs , n
)
code of sufficient large n such that
Pne ≤ ǫ
Re ≥ Rs − ǫ.
The secrecy capacity is then the supremum of achievable secret rates
Cs , sup
Pn
e
≤ǫ
{Rs : Rs is achievable} .
III. SECRECY CAPACITY OVER CORRELATED CHANNELS
We begin with introducing the secrecy capacity when the main channel is correlated with the eavesdrop-
per channel. Let fHM ,HE (hM , hE) be the joint probability density function (pdf) of HM and HE , which
are random variables of the fading power gains for the main and the eavesdropper channels respectively.
Assuming that the perfect CSIs of both channels are available at the transmitter, we modified the theorem
in [11] as follows.
Theorem 1 (Gopala’08): When the main and the eavesdropper channels are correlated with each other,
the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs = max
P (hM ,hE)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
hE
[
log (1 + hMP (hM , hE))− log (1 + hEP (hM , hE))
] (1)
× fHM ,HE (hM , hE) dhMdhE
such that E {P (HM ,HE)} ≤ P¯
6Proof: We follow the proof in [11] and describe only the places to be modified to include the
correlation. The main idea in [11] is the opportunistic transmission with a rate adaptation over the
quantized fading channel. Specifically, it first quantizes the main and the eavesdropper channel gains into
finite bins and then regards a quantized channel state as a time-invariant additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) wiretap channel. Thus the existence of a coding scheme to achieve the secrecy capacity at any
instant is guaranteed by the coding theorem of the AWGN wiretap channel in [5]. Averaging over all
channel states, the achievability of the secrecy capacity for the ergodic fading channel is finally proved.
This average secrecy rate is computed by as follows:
Rs =
∑
i
∑
j
(Rs)ij Pr (HM ≈ hM,i,HE ≈ hE,j) ,
where hM,i and hE,j are the i-th and the j-th quantized channel states of the main and the eavesdropper
channel respectively, and (Rs)ij is the secrecy rate of a time-invariant AWGN wiretap channel with
channel gains hM,i and hE,j . For the correlation scenario, Pr (HM ≈ hM,i,HE ≈ hE,j) is not from the
product of marginal pdfs of HM and HE but from the joint pdf of HM and HE . The remaining part of
the proof in [11] is the same for the correlation scenario.
A. Upper bounds of the secrecy capacity
It is well known that the capacity of the wireless channel without secrecy constraints highly depends
on the received power. If other resources such as the bandwidth and channel gains are fixed, the capacity
logarithmically increases with the SNR. In other words, the capacity has been on the increase with the
SNR, even though the effect of the SNR on the capacity gets smaller due to the concavity of a logarithm
function. However, for the wiretap channel the secrecy capacity converges into a certain value. This
behavior is in a striking contrast with the capacities of ordinary communication channels and thus the
excessively large signal power does not affect the secrecy capacity at all. Natural questions are then what
is the limiting value to which the secrecy capacity eventually converges as the SNR increases and how
this limit depends on other resources and/or parameters in the wiretap channel.
Let us rewrite the secrecy capacity of correlated channels from (1) as
Cs = max
P (HM ,HE)
EHM>HE [log (1 +HMP (HM ,HE))− log (1 +HEP (HM ,HE))] ,
where in general, the secrecy capacity is a result of the power allocation strategy, maxP (hM ,hE). However,
at high SNR regime, using log (1 + x) ≈ log(x) for large x, we get the secrecy capacity as follows:
Cs ≈ EHM>HE
[
log
(
HM
HE
)]
= C lims , (2)
7which clearly shows that as the signal power grows the secrecy capacity is determined by the channel
gain ratio regardless of the power allocation strategy. We regard the limit of secrecy capacity in (2) as an
upper bound 2 of the secrecy capacity and study the behaviors of the upper bound with different values
of the channel gain ratio and channel correlation.
Under the Rayleigh fading assumption, we now derive the limiting value (upper bound) of the secrecy
capacity for the wiretap channel in a closed form. To this end, let U = HM/HE . We will prove in
the following lemma that the pdf of U is determined by the average Channel power Gain Ratio (CGR),
κ = E[HM ]/E[HE ], and the Power Correlation Coefficient (PCC), ρ between HM and HE . Then the
upper bound of the secrecy capacity, i.e., C lims (κ, ρ), in (2) can be expressed in terms of a single random
variable U :
C lims (κ, ρ) =
∫ ∞
1
log u fU (u) du. (3)
To solve (3), we first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let HM and HE be the correlated exponential distributions. Then U = HM/HE has the
pdf given as
fU (u) = κ
(1− ρ) (u+ κ)[
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu
]3/2 .
Proof: Suppose HE = hE is given, then U = HM/hE is a function of a single random variable
HM . Therefore the conditional pdf of U is fU (u|hE) = hEfHM (uhE |hE) for hE ≥ 0. Then the pdf of
U is expressed in terms of the conditional pdf as
fU (u) =
∫
fU
(
u|h′E
)
fHE
(
h′E
)
dh′E
=
∫
h′EfHM
(
uh′E |h′E
)
fHE
(
h′E
)
dh′E
=
∫
h′EfHMHE
(
uh′E , h
′
E
)
dh′E . (4)
Let γ¯M = E[HM ] and γ¯E = E[HE]. By applying the joint pdf of HM and HE in Appendix to (4),
2Cs is monotonically increasing function with respect to P (HM , HE) since its derivative is always positive where HM > HE .
Thus Cs is bounded by Clims , limP (HM ,HE)→∞ Cs.
8we have
fU (u) =
∫ ∞
0
h′E
γ¯M γ¯E (1− ρ) exp
[
− h
′
E
1− ρ
(
u
γ¯M
+
1
γ¯E
)]
I0
(
2h′E
1− ρ
√
ρu
γ¯M γ¯E
)
dh′E
(a)
=
1
γ¯M γ¯E (1− ρ)
1
1−ρ
(
u
γ¯M
+ 1γ¯E
)
[(
1
1−ρ
(
u
γ¯M
+ 1γ¯E
))2
−
(
2
1−ρ
√
ρu
γ¯M γ¯E
)2]3/2
=
γ¯M
γ¯E
(1− ρ)
(
u+ γ¯Mγ¯E
)
[(
u+ γ¯Mγ¯E
)2
− 4ρ γ¯Mγ¯E u
]3/2 = κ (1− ρ) (u+ κ)[
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu
]3/2 ,
where I0 (x)
∆
= 12π
∫ 2π
0 e
x cos θdθ is the zero order modified bessel function of the first kind and (a)
follows from the table of integrals in [23],∫ ∞
0
x exp (−αx) I0 (βx) dx = α
(α2 + β2)
3
2
,
for Re{α} > |Re{β}|. Finally, we replace γ¯M/γ¯E with κ and finish the proof.
Since we have the pdf of U in Lemma 1, we can compute the secrecy capacity C lims (κ, ρ) in (3). After
series of mathematical manipulations, we find the limit of secrecy capacity in a closed form which is
summarized in Theorem 2. The resulting secrecy capacity in (5) consists of two terms, and we can clearly
see how CGR and PCC contribute to the secrecy capacity. The first term is the limit of secrecy capacity
when the channels are independent and thus depends only on CGR. On the other hand, the second term
explains the loss due to PCC. In Section III-B we will discuss details of the results in Theorem 2 and
have more insights into how the two channel parameters contribute to the secrecy capacity
Theorem 2: If the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel, and the joint pdf of them
is bivariate Rayleigh distribution, as SNR increases, the secrecy capacity converges into the following
limiting value
C lims (κ, ρ) = log (1 + κ) + log
(
1
2
+
√
1
4
− ρκ
(1 + κ)2
)
. (5)
Proof: It is possible to express the upper bound of the secrecy capacity C lims (κ, ρ) in (3) as
C lims (κ, ρ) = [log uFU (u)]
∞
1 −
∫ ∞
1
1
u
FU (u) du. (6)
with the integration by parts rule where FU (u) is the indefinite integral of fU (u). From Lemma 1,
9FU (u) is given by
FU (u) =
∫
fU (u) du
=
u− κ
2
√
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu
. (7)
The indefinite integral of the second term on the right side of (6) is∫
1
u
FU (u) du =
∫
1
u
u− κ
2
√
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu
du
=
1
2
log
(
−Φ (u)
κu
)
, (8)
where Φ (u) = 4 (1− ρ)
(
(u+ κ)2 + (u+ κ)
√
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu− 2ρκu
)
. By substituting (7) and (8)
into (6), we finally have the secrecy capacity limit as follows.
C lims (κ, ρ) =

 (u− κ) log u
2
√
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu


∞
1
−
[
1
2
log
(
−Φ (u)
κu
)]∞
1
=

 (1− κu) log u
2
√
1 + 2κ(1−2ρ)u +
κ2
u2
− 1
2
log
(
−Φ (u)
κu
)
u=∞
+
[
1
2
log
(
−Φ (u)
κu
)]
u=1
=
[
1
2
log
(
− κ
Φ (u) /u2
)]
u=∞
+
[
1
2
log
(
−Φ (u)
κu
)]
u=1
=
1
2
log

(1 + κ)2 + (1 + κ)
√
(1 + κ)2 − 4ρκ− 2ρκ
2


= log (1 + κ) + log
(
1
2
+
√
1
4
− ρκ
(1 + κ)2
)
.
B. Asymptotic properties of the secrecy capacity
Our primary interest is then the impact of CGR on the limiting value of the secrecy capacity. To examine
the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy capacity, we first consider two extreme cases: 1) independent
case ρ = 0 and 2) completely correlated case ρ = 1. When the main and eavesdropper channels are
10
independent, i.e., ρ = 0, C lims in (5) becomes
C lims (κ, 0) = log (1 + κ) , (9)
≈


κ for κ≪ 1,
log κ for κ≫ 1
(10)
which depends only on CGR. This is analogous to the capacity formula of an AWGN channel without
secrecy constraints if CGR is regarded as the SNR in the capacity formula for the AWGN channel. In
(10), we approximate C lims at high and low CGR regimes and find that C lims is linearly proportional to
CGR at low CGR regime but it becomes logarithmic at high CGR regime.
The result in Theorem 2 also shows that the effect of the correlation is only detrimental. Note that
the second term in (5) represents the loss due to the correlation and it is in the range from − log 12 to 0
since 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and κ ≥ 0. In the worst case that PCC approaches one, i.e., the completely correlated
scenario, the limiting value of the secrecy capacity in (5) is given by
lim
ρ→1
C lims (κ, ρ) =


log κ, for κ > 1
0, for 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1.
(11)
Worthy of note is that there still exists the positive secrecy capacity when κ > 1 even if the channels
are completely correlated. This result can be interpreted by considering the AWGN wiretap channel in
[5]. Although the statistics of both channels are identical (ρ→ 1), the power gain of the main channel is
larger than that of eavesdropper channel (κ > 1). Thus it can be viewed as the AWGN wiretap channel
where the received SNR of the legitimate receiver is larger than that of the eavesdropper. This always
provides the transmitter with the opportunity to send the secret messages, which explains how the positive
secrecy is achievable even in the completely correlated case. For 0 < ρ < 1, the limiting value of the
secrecy capacity is bounded by (9) and (11).
To investigate the relative loss with respect to the independent case where the secrecy capacity limit
is maximized, we find upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity limit C lims (κ, ρ) in terms of
C lims (κ, 0) and ρ. Such bounds are summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: For given κ and ρ, C lims (κ, ρ) is bounded by
(1− ρ)C lims (κ, 0) ≤ C lims (κ, ρ) ≤ C lims (κ, 0) .
Proof: The proof is equivalent to showing that
1− ρ ≤ C
lim
s (κ, ρ)
C lims (κ, 0)
≤ 1.
11
It is easily verified that C lims (κ, ρ) /C lims (κ, 0) monotonically increases with CGR (κ ≥ 0). Thus we can
obtain the lower and upper bounds by letting κ → 0 and κ → ∞ respectively. First, we can see that
C lims (κ, ρ) in (5) tends to log(1 + κ) = C lims (κ, 0) as κ increases, which gives us the upper bound. By
applying the L’Hoˆpital’s rule to limκ→0C lims (κ, ρ)/C lims (κ, 0), we have the lower bound as
lim
κ→0
log(1 + κ) + log
(
1
2 +
√
1
4 − ρκ(1+κ)2
)
log(1 + κ)
= 1− ρ
which finishes this proof.
In this section we have seen the asymptotic behaviors of the secrecy capacity in a few limiting situations.
Although such analysis gives insights into how the channel parameters affect the secrecy capacity we are
also interested in the secrecy capacity at moderate SNR values. In the next section, we will evaluate the
secrecy capacity in a quantitative manner.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy capacity for different PCC values in a range of SNR values
and confirm the analytic results in Section III-B. We also discuss how an active eavesdropper can take
advantage of the correlation to decrease the secrecy capacity.
To evaluate the secrecy capacity Cs in (1), the instantaneous signal power P (hM , hE) must be
determined in a way to maximize the information rate for the average power constraint,
E {P (HM ,HE)} ≤ P¯ .
In such a way, we use the method of Lagrange multipliers and have the following optimal power allocation
strategy [11]:
P (hM , hE) =
1
2


√(
1
hE
− 1
hM
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
hE
− 1
hM
)
−
(
1
hM
+
1
hE
)
+
, (12)
where [x]+ = max {0, x} and λ is a Lagrange multiplier determined by the power constraint. Applying
the power allocation P (hM , hE) in (12) to the secrecy capacity formula in (1), we numerically evaluate
the secrecy capacity at each SNR value with two CGR values: 1) for the symmetric case and 2) for the
asymmetric case. The evaluations for the symmetric (CGR = 1.0) and asymmetric (CGR = 0.5) cases are
depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively where the curves for ρ = 0 correspond to the results in [11]. To
confirm our work in Section III-B, we also evaluate the limits of the secrecy capacity in (5) and compare
them with the secrecy capacity curves. The comparisons show that the secrecy capacity curves with
the different PCC values converge into the limit of the secrecy capacity C lims (κ, ρ). Thus, the analytic
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Fig. 2. The perfect secrecy rate as a function of average power for the symmetric case (CGR=1.0); The solid lines indicate
the upper bounds on secrecy capacity in (5), and the lines with filled circles represent the numerical evaluations of the secrecy
capacity in (1).
results in Section III-B is confirmed by the numerical evaluations. As aforementioned, such convergence
implies that the signal power becomes more inefficient as it grows, and eventually the secrecy capacity
is independent of the signal power.
Figs. 4 and 5 show the impact of CGR and PCC on the limiting value of the secrecy capacity. In Fig.
4, the limit of the secrecy capacity C lims (κ, ρ) in (5) is evaluated at a few PCC values where C lims (κ, ρ)
has different behaviors in low and high CGR regimes. In low CGR regime, the correlation significantly
degrades the limit of the secrecy capacity, which is predicted by lower bound in Corollary 1. Since the
loss due to the correlation is especially serious in low CGR regime an active eavesdropper efficiently
decreases the secrecy capacity by approaching the legitimate receiver, which thus results in not only high
PCC but also low CGR. Equivalently, if the transmitter does not know or underestimate the correlation,
the overestimated secrecy capacity results in information leak to the eavesdropper. Thus, the transmission
rate must be determined in a conservative way to consider the possible correction.
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Fig. 3. The perfect secrecy rate as a function of average power for the asymmetric case (CGR=0.5); The solid lines indicate
the upper bounds on secrecy capacity in (5), and the lines with filled circles represent the numerical evaluations of the secrecy
capacity in (1).
On the contrary, the impact of the correlation becomes negligible as CGR increases, and all curves
for the correlated fading scenario eventually approach the secrecy capacity limit of i.i.d. fading scenario.
Thus, the correlation is not an efficient way to break the security in high CGR regime. In Fig. 4, it is
also noticed that even if the channel are completely correlated, we have a positive secrecy capacity when
CGR is larger than one (0 dB) as we mentioned in Section III-B.
In Corollary 1, we show that the limit of secrecy capacity is low bounded by (1− ρ)C lims (κ, 0) in low
CGR regime. To confirm this we depict the normalized loss of the secrecy capacity limit C lims (κ, ρ)/C lims (κ, 0)
in Fig. 5 where the normalized loss exactly follows the bound 1− ρ. In addition, in high CGR regime,
the normalized loss converges into one, which confirms the results in Corollary 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
We investigate the secrecy capacity of an ergodic fading wiretap channel in which the main channel
is correlated with the eavesdropper channel. In this study, the full Channel State Information (CSI) is
assumed, and thus the transmitter knows the channel gains of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
To see the detrimental effect of the correlation, we find the joint probability density function of the
correlated Rayleigh fading wiretap channel with which we evaluate the secrecy capacity. In the evaluation,
it is noticed that the secrecy capacity converges into a limit with the growing signal-to-noise ratio as
opposed to ever increasing capacity of conventional communication channels. Since it is also interesting
to see the roles of the channel parameters in the secrecy capacity, we try to find the limit of the secrecy
capacity in a closed form and extensively study the behaviors of the limit in various situations.
Our study tells that the limit of the secrecy capacity determined by the two channel parameters;
average channel gain ratio (CGR) and power correlation coefficient (PCC). The study also shows that
the correlation is especially detrimental when CGR is small. Thus, by approaching a legitimate receiver
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Fig. 5. Normalized secrecy capacity limit versus CGR
an active eavesdropper can efficiently incapacitate the wiretap channel codes even if the transmitter can
afford high transmit signal power since such close proximity leads to low CGR and high PCC. To get
more insight in low CGR regime, we find a lower bound of the secrecy capacity limit which has a linear
relation with PCC. That is, the secrecy capacity linearly degrades with increasing correlation, and we
confirm that the lower bound is tight enough especially in low CGR regime. This result implies that a
margin of transmission rate for confidential messages must be taken into account to cope with possible
correlation caused by an active eavesdropper. In such efforts our work provides a criterion to decide the
rate margin.
On the other hand, the correlation does not affect the secrecy capacity when CGR is high. Thus,
although we do not propose a specific way here, our study indicates that the most efficient way to defeat
the active eavesdropper is to improve CGR, which will be pursued in our future research.
The analysis on the limit of the secrecy capacity is confirmed by evaluating the secrecy capacity in a
numerical way and comparing them with the analytic results. Although the correlation is one of important
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parameters, to the best of our knowledge, the effects of the correlation on wiretap channel codes have
not been investigated. We believe that our work paves the way for a new study on the correlation wiretap
channel.
APPENDIX
THE JOINT PDF OF HM AND HE
Let the random variables RM and RE be the envelopes of complex Gaussian random variables, GM
and GE , respectively. The joint pdf of correlated random variables RM and RE is then the bivariate
Rayleigh distribution which is given by [24],
fRM ,RE (rM , rE) =
4rMrE
γ¯M γ¯E (1− ρ) exp
[
− 1
1− ρ
(
r2M
γ¯M
+
r2E
γ¯E
)]
I0
(
2
√
ρrMrE
1− ρ√γ¯M γ¯E
)
,
where I0 (x)
∆
= 12π
∫ 2π
0 e
x cos θdθ, γ¯M = E
[
R2M
]
, γ¯E = E
[
R2E
]
, and ρ = cov
(
r2M , r
2
E
)
/
√
var
(
r2M
)
var
(
r2E
)
is the power correlation coefficient of (0 ≤ ρ < 1). ρ is related to the correlation coefficient, ρGM ,GE of
GM and GE by ρ = |ρGM ,GE |2. Now let the fading power gains HM and HE be defined by
hM = ξ1 (rM , rE) = |rM |2 and hE = ξ2 (rM , rE) = |rE|2 ,
then the joint pdf of HM and HE can be obtained directly from the joint pdf of RM and RE using by
the Jacobian of the transformation [25]:
fHM ,HE (hM , hE) = fRM ,RE
(
ξ−11 (hM , hE) , ξ
−1
2 (hM , hE)
) |J (hM , hE)| ,
where |J (hM , hE)| is the Jacobian of the transformation defined by
|J (hM , hE)| = det

 ∂ξ−11 /∂hM ∂ξ−11 /∂hE
∂ξ−12 /∂hM ∂ξ
−1
2 /∂hE

 .
Therefore the joint pdf of HM and HE is
fHM ,HE (hM , hE) = fRM ,RE
(
ξ−11 (hM , hE) , ξ
−1
2 (hM , hE)
) |J (hM , hE)|
=
4
√
hMhE
γ¯M γ¯E (1− ρ) exp
[
− 1
1− ρ
(
hM
γ¯M
+
hE
γ¯E
)]
I0
(
2
√
ρ
√
hMhE
1− ρ√γ¯M γ¯E
) ∣∣∣∣ 14√hMhE
∣∣∣∣
=
1
γ¯M γ¯E (1− ρ) exp
[
− 1
1− ρ
(
hM
γ¯M
+
hE
γ¯E
)]
I0
(
2
1− ρ
√
ρhMhE
γ¯M γ¯E
)
.
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